Part 3: Allied deployment in the area on June 15

The Duke of Wellington and his liaison to the Prussian Army, Müffling, both stared at the map, showing the overall deployment of Allied forces in the area between Mons and Namur.

Almost all troops present under Allied command were units belonging to the 1^st Army Corps.

Starting in the west he explained to Müffling that the town of Mons itself was defended by two brigades of cavalry, the 3^rd British and the Hanoverian brigade. To the east of the town the 7^th cavalry brigade had concentrated.

The 3^rd British Division was deployed up the road to the north at Soignies, with the 1^st being further up in the north around Enghien.

At La Louviere, to the east of Mons, the 3^rd Netherlands Division had formed up while the 2^nd Netherlands was in the general area of Quatre-Bras, considerably dispersed, however.

Now Müffling extended the line for the Duke, pointing out that the 1^st Prussian Army Corps was deployed around Charleroi, guarding the different river crossings there. To the east of that was the 3^rd Army Corps on the road heading west on the morning of June 15^th, while the 2^nd Army Corps was partially coming down from the north and partially on the road from Namur. The problem for the 3^rd Corps was that the roads available to it were in a rather poor state and thus slowed down movement speed drastically – especially the wagons.

Overall Müffling was deeply worried that the British/Allied army was far too dispersed to be able to face a concentrated French push anywhere on the map. Yet Wellington reassured him that he would be able to arrive anywhere on the map in time to face the French, should the Prussians do their part and cooperate with the Allied forces.

I have decided not to use military symbols because of the overall size of the map - I have also added the main roads as to give a more comprehensive view on the situation

Current overall strength:

Allied Army: 33089 men

Prussian Army : 88689 men

Teil 2: 15. Juni 1815, gegen 10.45:

an den südlichen Zugängen von Charleroi:

Napoleon selbst war an der Spitze der Armee mitgeritten. Die Pioniere waren in die vorderste Position der Kolonne befohlen worden, um sofort etwaige Schäden an den so wichtigen Brücken über die Sambre reparieren zu können. Mit ernsthaftem Widerstand hatte er nicht gerechnet.

Umso überraschter war er, als er am nördlichen Ufer der Sambre, westlich von Charleroi, mehrere preußische Batterien ausmachen konnte, und mitansehen musste, wie deren überraschend gezieltes Feuer einige seiner Pioniere auf der Chaussee niederrissen. Aufhalten ließen sich die Pioniere der Garde durch diesen Umstand natürlich nicht, auch wenn die erste Kompanie der Garde-Pioniere nach links ausscherte, um sich erst einmal wieder neu zu formieren.

Vorgeschobene Aufklärer machten schließlich die feindliche Vorpostenlinie bei einer Brücke über einen kleinen Seitenkanal der Sambre aus, die die Straße in die Stadt selbst führte. Um das Momentum des Vormarsches aufrecht zu erhalten und bei den nachrückenden Truppen keinen Stau zu verursachen, ließ Napoleon persönlich die zweite Kompanie Garde-Pioniere die Bajonette aufpflanzen und gegen die Plänkler vorrücken. Mit dem altbekannten „Vive L'Empéreur“ stürmten die gut 100 Mann auf der Chaussée nach Norden über die Brücke und konnten bei geringen eigenen Verlusten die preußischen Schützen von der Hauptstraße vertreiben und somit den Weg nach Charleroi selbst öffnen. 

Etwa zur gleichen Zeit brachte die leichte Kavalleriebrigade der Garde ihre beiden berittenen Batterien in Stellung, die neben einer weiteren der 4. Kavalleriedivision das Feuer auf die Truppen und Geschütze am nördlichen Ufer der Sambre eröffneten. In die Stadt selbst konnte man zwar wegen des Geländes und der Mauer nicht feuern, aber auf das Gebiet westlich davon sehr wohl. So dauerte es nicht lange, bis die dortigen preußischen Truppen unter lebhaftem Beschuss standen und sich früher oder später entscheiden mussten, ob sie bleiben und sterben oder doch eher den Rückzug nach Norden antreten würden.

Bis jetzt lief in diesem Bereich alles nach Plan. Die ersten beiden Brigaden der jungen Garde erschienen dicht hinter der leichten Kavallerie und würden noch vor 11 Uhr in die Kämpfe um die Stadt eingreifen können.

Des Weiteren waren auch im Raum des IIIe Korps keine großen Feindansammlungen gemeldet worden.

Nur vom Reserveflügel und von Davout hatte Napoleon noch nichts gehört. War man hier auf die Hauptmacht der Briten gestoßen?

Part 2: June 15, 10.45 am

 

 

near Mons:

More and more French troops were spotted on the roads leading to Mons. Major-General Dornberg, of the 3^rd Cavalry Brigade, had also made contact with some French Dragoons coming up along the second road leading into Mons from the south. He estimated the strength of the enemy in front of him to at least 2,000 cavalrymen and some 15 guns. As he was rather worried about his left flank, knowing that unreliable Dutch and Hanoverian cavalry was stationed there, he decided to rather withdraw to the North of the town and redeploy there – hoping that more troops would arrive there to delay the enemy. He knew that cavalry alone would not be enough to stop the enemy in front of him, as he had seen that there was infantry following close after the cavalry in front of him.

It looked as if it would be a rather fluent battle around Mons, with the Allied forces falling back slowly until their strength was gathered significantly enough to oppose the advancing enemy on the ground of their choosing.

At Charleroi:

The two batteries deployed to the west of town had opened fire on the dense French columns on the road, as soon as they had come into range. 14 x 6 pounders engaged what was soon to be identified as Engineers of the Imperial Guard. General-Major Pirch of the 2^nd Infantry brigade watched with some worry as the French deployed more and more guns on the ground to the south of Charleroi, well in range of his position on the other side of the river. Those guns would also cause some problems while he withdrew to the north, he pondered. Nevertheless he decided to make the French pay for every inch of ground and thus ordered some hundred skirmishers to defend the bridge leading into town. Supported by his guns, he thought they'd be able to delay the spotted troops for a bit, while not falling prey to the soon deployed cavalry. He immediately identified this cavalry as the “Chasseurs à cheval de la garde impériale” - the mounted guard chasseurs, with their distinctive red and black bearskins – one of the most famous units in Napoleon's guard. Behind those units he saw more units pouring down the chaussee, which looked to be wearing equally impressive uniforms – so more guards.

He dispatched a courier to his corps commander and requested permission to abandon Charleroi, should the enemy decide to press this matter with superior forces. While he was waiting for a response he already started getting his wagon train onto the road and ready for departure towards the north.

Just at this very moment, after the courier, a young lieutenant under his command accompanied by a sergeant, had left his position, he saw a tightly packed column advance against his skirmishers at the bridge. Supported by what looked to be at least 20 guns now, this column, which he believed to be at least 200 men strong, advanced towards his men. Rather than to stand and fight it out, his skirmishers decided to fall back into the houses to either side of the road, firing as they fell back. A wise choice, Pirch thought, since there was no formed infantry nearby to support his skirmishers, simply because he had considered it unwise to move more units across the river, as he was certain that sooner or later he would have to withdraw from the town altogether.

This quick and well executed attack by the French, however, had robbed Pirch of his strong forward position and thus he was well aware that he would soon have to make the decision on whether to engage with his entire brigade or fall back.

He knew that there was a strong position on a small rise supported by some heavy guns of the corps artillery just to the north of Charleroi, but there were only two brigades of infantry (including his own) and some very weak supporting cavalry squadrons in the general area. This would be by far not enough to engage even half of Napoleon's very strong guard corps. And, the guard used to never show up on its own – there would be regular infantry close behind it, General-Major Pirch was sure of it!

Teil 1: 15. Juni 1815, gegen 9 Uhr

Francois Deville, ein Gemüsebauer südlich von Mons, kam gerade aus seinem Stall, um einen frischen Eimer Wasser zu holen, als er Trommeln und Trompetenklang wahrnahm. Mit der Zeit kam dieser Wirbel immer näher und wurde immer lauter, bis er schließlich die ersten Flaggen auf der Chausée ausmachen konnte. Von überall her stürmten die Leute aus ihren Häusern und Gehöften, um dem Spektakel beizuwohnen.

„Ils sont des Français!“ schallte es durch die Straßen – ungefähr im gleich Augenblick, als die Reiter des hannoveranischen Husarenregiments „Duke of Cumberland“ hastig aufsaßen und gen Norden dahin preschten.

Napoleon 1er, der ehemalige und neue Kaiser Frankreichs, hatte sich mit seiner Armee nach Norden gewandt, um die Truppen von Großbritannien und Preußen zu schlagen, bevor er sich mit den Armeen Österreichs und Russlands beschäftigen würde.

Der Plan sah Folgendes vor: seine Hauptstreitmacht, die Armée du Nord, würde sich bei Charleroi zwischen Blücher und Wellington schieben, um diese getrennt zu vernichten, während eine Reserve, unter dem „eisernen“ Marschall Davout, von Mons aus nach Norden vorstoßen würde, um den Rückzugsweg Wellingtons abzuschneiden und dessen Untergang zu besiegeln.

Leider konnte Napoleon nicht mehr über so viele fähige Anführer verfügen wie einst in den glorreichen Kampagnen von 1805 oder 1809, aber auf einen konnte er sich noch immer verlassen: Louis Davout – der einst mit seinem Korps eine gesamte preußische Armee bei Auerstädt vernichtet hatte. Die beiden anderen verfügbaren Marschälle, Grouchy und Ney, würde er unter seinem persönlichen Kommando behalten und sie nicht aus seiner Kontrolle lassen.

Wie Napoleon wusste, war Wellington breit gefächert aufgestellt, um möglichst viele Anmarschwege abzusichern. Dies wollte er ausnützen, um bei Charleroi mit seiner Hauptmacht durch die alliierten Linien durchzustoßen und Blücher zu vernichten, bevor Wellington sich konzentrieren konnte. Gleichzeitig würde das Reservekorps dieses Unternehmen unterstützen, indem es beim Marsch von Mons gen Norden so viele Truppen wie möglich binden, und weiters Wellington in seinem Glauben stärken würde, dass der eigentliche Hauptstoß von Napoleon gen Oostende gerichtet ist.

Am Abend des 14. Juni 1815 sind deshalb folgende Depeschen an die verschiedenen Kommandanten geschickt worden:

im Bereich Reserveflügel:

An GenDiv Merlin, 6e Division de Cavalerie:

Ihre Division bildet die Avant-Garde des Ve Corps. Setzen Sie sich deshalb bei Sonnenaufgang Richtung Mons in Marsch und klären sie die dortigen Kräfte frühzeitig auf. Es ist von höchster Wichtigkeit, dass der Feind im Raum Mons schnell geworfen wird und sie mit ihrer Reiterei sofort nachsetzen. Sobald Mons eingenommen ist, setzen sie Richtung Norden nach und bewegen sich Richtung Soignies, und der dortigen Straßenkreuzung.

An GenDiv Rottenburg, 15e Division d'Infantrie:

Tagesbefehl für den 15. Juno: Vorrücken Richtung Mons und darüber hinaus Richtung Soignies. Unterstützen und Koordinieren mit der 6e Div de Cavalerie, um eine zügige Einnahme von Mons zu gewährleisten sowie um den Weg Richtung Norden für das nachrückende Korps zu öffnen.

Geschwindigkeit und Elan sind höchste Priorität!

Bereich Armee du Nord:

An die Garde:

Ein umgehendes Übersetzen über die Sambre im Raum Charleroi ist von höchster Priorität. Deshalb fällt diese Aufgabe den Pionieren und Voraustruppen der Garde zu. Der Kaiser ist überzeugt, diese Truppen werden diese Aufgabe mit Überlegenheit meistern.

An das IVe Corps:

Bringen Sie ihr Korps über die Sambre im Bereich Chatelet mit weiterer Marschrichtung Culbart, Fleurus. Geschwindigkeit, Elan und energisches Nachsetzen sind von höchster Priorität!

Ihr Korps bildet den rechten Flügel der Armee – handeln sie dementsprechend!

The main French plan of advance

Part 1: June 14, 1815

The past few days have been anything but satisfying. The large multinational force that was at Wellington's disposal had to be properly organized and deployed.

After Napoleon's return Wellington actually had to fight for his allotment of troops. Quite a number of German city states were willing to provide soldiers for the larger European powers, but Prussia, trying to establish its hegemony over all of Germany, wanted to be the only one to lead them into battle. Understandably, empires like Austria, Russia and Great Britain had something against that. Eventually it was established that the Duke of Wellington would be given priority in order to reach the required 150,000 men that were to make up the Army contributed by Great Britain to the war against Napoleon.

Since Flanders was the designated area for this army, it was only logical that the Belgian and Dutch contingents would be apart of Wellington's force. This, of course, provided the Duke with a number of difficulties, since he could not afford to dismiss these troops, but also could not rely on them, due to obvious reasons.

Being well aware of his inferiority towards the French forces not only in numbers but also in quality, he had to rely on the support of the Prussian army, under Field Marshall Blücher, concentrating to the east of his position. To ensure cooperation with him, he had to stay in detached contact with his deployment, but at the same time he had to worry about both Brussels and a possible route to the sea and safety, just in case things went sour. To further his difficult situation even more, reports arrived that a large French force opposing the Austrians on the Rhine had been able to disengage entirely and move to the north east to rejoin Napoleon. The possibility that Napoleon had also brought the reserves from Paris up to the north, could not be ignored or dismissed either. Intelligence reports were sketchy at best.

All these issues and problems were constantly coming up over these past days and thus the situation was anything but satisfactory.

This morning, however, was different. Wellington was content that his army had finally reached a position from where it was able to detect any movement along the entire length of the line.

His liaison to the Prussian army, Karl Freiherr von Müffling, had assured him that the Prussian army was about to move closer to him – thus making a cooperation easier or even possible in the first place.

The orders remained the same for the entire army: Stay alert and look for any signs of enemy movement along the entire line.

“Something's afoot”:

The first few couriers bearing alarming messages left their respective commands:

From Col. Estorff, Hanoverian Cavalry at Mons:

We have spotted a large column of French troops coming down the main chaussee heading north towards Mons. My picket line of hussars was quickly driven off and I have elected to redeploy my brigade on the north side of Mons.

I will send further information about strength and enemy intentions once available. Awaiting further orders,

Your humble servant,

Colonel Estorff

Similar messages were dispatched towards the Prussian headquarters at Namur.

General-Major Pirch II, 2^nd Infantry Brigade, I Army Corps:

“We have spotted a large French column on the main chaussee south of Charleroi. My scouts were able to identify some of those troops as Napoleon's Old Guard, amongst them the Chasseurs à cheval. Reports of patrols also indicate a crossing of French troops somewhere to the South-West of my position. I will delay the enemy according to my orders and then withdraw in good order on the main road towards north.

Generalleuttnant Zieten, I Army Corps to Field Marshal Blücher:

Field Marshal,

I have to report significant enemy activities along my sector of the front line. At least 3 enemy columns are moving northwards onto my position. French guard units have been reported south of Charleroi. I fear that I am unable to hold my position without further reinforcements. Wishing to know if you have any further orders – if not, I will follow my standing orders and delay the enemy as long as possible and then withdraw to the north to seek support of the other army corps.

Your humble servant

GenLt. Zieten